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ABSTRACT
A theory is advanced and tested which proposes that expect-
ation effects are functionally separable from facilitation
effects in processing; ie, a word will be facilitated if a
similar or identical stimulus preceeds it, but an additional
positive effect will be found if there is a high expectation for
the word. The Stroop effect was used with a cue word which could
be the same as the test word, a different word, or a control word
The probability of the cue being identical to the test word was
manipulated to vary the subject's expectancy for a particular
Stroop test word. Subjects responded with either the color name
or the word name, dependent upon a tone just previous to the
test word. Results indicate that an expectancy has its effect
by speeding the processing of the expected stimulus (ie_, the
word name) through the limited capacity channel, with a subse-
quent facilitory effect upon the processing of competing but
later stimuli (ie, the color name) . There was little negative
effect of an incorrect expectation upon color naming. The
facilitation conditions with no expectation also had very little
effect, contradicting Warren's results (1972) of a negative
effect upon color naming. Hypotheses are advanced to explain
these and other results.
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1Posner and his associates have proposed a model of human
information processing (Posner and Klein, 1973; Posner and Snyder,
1974; Keele, 1973; Posner and Boies, 1971) which identifies two
very broad areas of processing, the sensory-memory area and a
limited capacity area. Through the sensory-memory area, all
sensory inputs enter the processing channels. Long ten, memory,
including graphemic, semantic, and phonemic information, is also
identified with this area. The limited capacity channel is where
in-depth processing of material supplied by the sensory-memory
area takes place.
The primary mechanism in the sensory-memory area will be
presumed to be spreading activation (Meyer, Schvaneveldt
, and
Ruddy, 1972, 1973; Collins and Quillian, 1970, 1972; Schvaneveldt
and Meyer, 1973; Pavlov, 1927). This might then be characterized
as being relatively strategy free, at least in the conscious
sense. Its reliance will rather be on simple "automatic" mech-
anisms such as activation and facilitation.
For the purposes of this paper, facilitation will be
abstractly defined as: a trace or node in the sensory-memory area
needing less activation to go over the threshold for full activ-
ation due to residual activity from previous similar stimulation
(Meyer, Schvaneveldt. and Ruddy, 1973; Keele, 1973). If the same
or a "nearby" node (one with little semantic distance, such as
water to wet) has been previously activated, the concept will be
facilitated in reaching full activation for a short period of
2time. This means that its semantic and phonemic properties will
be available for future processing sooner than if it had not been
previously activated. I will use the term facilitation only in
connection with the sensory-memory area.
Following the Posner-type theory (Keele, 1973; Posner and
Klein, 1973)
,
activity in the sensory-memory area will be pre-
sumed to be pre- or at least un- conscious. Instead, conscious
thought occurs in the limited capacity channel. Here, strategies
might operate a good portion of the time, while problem-solving,
sentence comprehension, response preparation, etc. are occurring.
Since this is where conscious processing is presumed to occur, it
might also be predicted that expectancies will show their effects
somewhere in this area. If the word "cookie" is consciously
expected to occur, then the limited capacity area can begin pre-
paring so that the word will be processed as efficiently as
possible and the response will be ready and waiting.
Expectancy effects and all advance activities which occur
or are initiated in the limited capacity area when the subject
can reasonably predict what will occur next (on an experimental
trial, in a paragraph, or otherwise) will be labeled here as
priming effects.
By these definitions, priming effects should be highly
separable from facilitation effects. Facilitation occurs auto-
matically (Keele, 1973; Posner and Klein, 1973); there is nothing
the subject can do about it, and it occurs with or without
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e*P^tancy. If the word "cat" is presented on one
trial of a
"respond-yes-if-the-word-is-an-animal" task, then the
word "cat" or even "dog" will be encoded and accessed faster if
it occurs on the next trial, since the activation level of both
"cat" and "dog" are already high. This occurs whether or not
the subject expected "cat" or "dog" to occur next.
If the subject had expected "dog" next, then priming effects
would also come into play. The subject might prepare the limited
capacity channel for the word "dog" by: a) preparing to filter
out all non-"dog" stimuli. This ensures that the full proc-
essing capacity of the limited capacity channel is directed at
the correct stimulus, b) setting up the sequence of operations
(the strategy) which will be applied to the word. When the word
comes in, the route it should take for most efficient processing
has already been decided and the "gates" to channel it that way
are already set. c) preparing the proper response, etc.
Given this model, priming and facilitation are not entirely
independent. Priming effects cannot occur without facilitation
also occurring, since an expectancy for an item will automatically
have raised the activation level for that item in the sensory-
memory area. Facilitation, however, could occur without causing
a priming effect.
This model suggests the following general questions to be
investigated: a) Can the rough model be validated or disproven
in any way? b) Can priming be functionally or temporally
separated from facilitation? e) What is the effect of priming
upon information? Does it inhibit unexpected information? Does
it speed expected information? d) What is the actual mechanism
of priming? Is it a filter or possibly an "operation sequencer"
as hinted at above, or exactly what?
A££roach. Warren (1972) used the classic Stroop effect
(Stroop, 1935) to study stimulus encoding and memory by varying
the categorical relation of a priming word to a test word pre-
sented soon after. The task was to name the color of ink in
which the test word was presented.
In the Stroop effect, a color word such as
-'blue" is printed
in a different color ink, eg. red. The subject's task is to
name the color of the ink. Substantial interference has been
found to occur in the color naming task (Stroop, 1935; Jensen
and Rohwer, 1966). It has also been found that there is a lesser
interference, although still easily measurable, by anv word
printed in color ink (Klein, 1964; Scheibe, Shaver, and Carrier,
1967). The usual explanations involve one form or another of
response competition (cf. Dyer, 19 73) or encoding differences
(eg. Seymour, 19"U)
.
Warren used the Stroop effect to study stimulus encoding
and memory by applying the logogen model of Morton (1969) . One
aspect of Morton's model is that the threshold of availability
for a logogen or dictionary unit is set by the past frequency of
occurrence of the word. Presentation of a word causes activation
of the motor or speech logogens for that word, resulting in an
automatic response tendency to say the word. Since the actual
task is to name the color of the ink, the logogens corresponding
to that color are also activated. Production of the color name
will be delayed by an amount dependent upon the extent to which
the word name becomes available to the limited capacity channel
before the color name.
This involves the assumption that the Stroop effect occurs
before a final output stage of processing. Support for this view
has recently been provided by Seymour (197H)
, who has presented
evidence that the Stroop effect is caused by the word capturing
some of the available processing capacity, thereby delaying the
encoding of the display, rather than by covert response compe-
tition or response selection problems. (For a more complete
discussion of these three hypotheses, see Dalrymple-Alford and
Azkoul, 1972).
Klein (1964) has found that interference to color naming
increases as the frequency of the word increases, lending support
to Morton's (1969) threshold model, since a high frequency word
will have a lower threshold and be more likely to reach the
limited capacity channel before the color name. Warren then
showed that "priming" (facilitation, in my terms) using an
associate caused the threshold for the word to be reached sooner,
thereby increasing the Stroop interference.
Several interesting hypotheses can be formed relating to
6priming. If the subject has a high expectancy for a word, there
might be an attempt to inhibit or "counter-prime" the word, since
the task is to name the color, not the word. At first glance,
this would seem to imply that priming would reduce the Stroop
effect. However, counter-priming may also occupy limited
capacity capabilities, so that inhibiting a word might actually
slow the color name's entrance into the channel.
To further complicate the issue is a finding by Klein (196U)
that if the response area of the limited capacity channel is
allowed to output the word very quickly, then color naming is
not interfered with to as great an extent. What Klein did was
to have the subjects name the word first, then the color. He
found very little increase in color naming; much smaller than
it should have been unless the Stroop interference was being
reduced. This finding was later validated by Dyer (1971), who
varied the pre-exposure of the word prior to coloration, thereby
varying the amount of advance word processing relative to color
processing. This implies that, even though the word may have
taken over the limited capacity channel before the color, if the
word can be rushed through and not inhibited then interference
can be reduced by clearing the channel faster. Priming might be
just the activity to speed the word through the channel.
Priming, then, could: a) cause a specific inhibition of
the word, decreasing the Stroop interference, b) cause a specific
inhibition of the word, thereuy ''clogging" the limited capacity
7channel so that the color name's entrance into the channel is
slowed even more than with no expectancy for the word, c) cause
the word to be output more quickly, freeing the channel to
process the color narr.e sooner, or d) produce no measurable I
effect at all.
Another question being asked implicitly is: what is the
effect of processing of the word upon later processing of the
color? If priming speeds processing of the word, then will the
color name enter the limited capacity channel sooner? In other
words, when dealing with processing in the limited capacity
channel, is there a dependency upon the time course of preceeding
information?
Some of the possible priming effects would not necessarily
show up in varying reaction times to the color naming task,
however, since much depends upon the exact point in the limited
capacity channel at which priming and inhibition are initiated.
For instance, suppose that priming occurs and the word is rushed
through the channel, but that the priming occurs at some point
after the bottleneck which is holding back the color name. Then
the color may have entered the channel with its normal interfered
with time course and be following through at its normal
interfered with speed, even though the channel is relatively
clear ahead of it. To take the reverse attack, assume that the
word is suppressed, but not until just before a final output
stage. Then the color name would be following along the inter-
8fered with time course right up to the response stage. So even
though priming is having an effect upon the word, there could
be little change in color naming reaction time.
Of course, there could be a dramatic change in color naming
time if, for instance: a) The word is inhibited fairly early in
the limited capacity channel, slowing its flow at that point and
abnormally slowing the color name's entrance into the channel,
b) The word is primed and rushed through early in the process,
allowing the color to get in sooner, or c) The word is
suppressed totally right at the start all™™ +u is Ln S1-a r, llowing the color name to
capture all of the limited capacity channel.
The present method of differentiating between some of these
cases was to introduce a word probe into the task, besides the
existing color probe. On a fraction of the trials, the subject
was required to name the actual word presented rather than the
color in which it was presented. This made it possible to see
what happened to the word independently of its effect upon the
color name. For instance, if the word was primed at some point
after the bottleneck, word naming time would decrease and color
naming time would stay the same relative to the facilitated but
unprimed condition. If the word was inhibited from the very
start, word naming time should increase greatly while color
naming time should decrease, and so on.
Probably the most interesting hypothesis is that priming
could cause the word to be processed faster, with a resultant
improvement in color naming reaction time. This would imply that
at least in this situation pricing had a distinctly positive
effect and that processing in the limited capacity channel is
dependent upon the time course of previous information. Given
Klein's (1964) and Dyer's (1971) findings, this result would not
be entirely unexpected.
METHOD
Subjects. Six people from the University of Massachusetts
at Amherst served as subjects (Ss) in the experiment. They were
paid $2.00 an hour for a total of ten hours of participation
each. Ss were questioned to assure normal vision and hearing
with no color blindness.
Materials. Six words and a control "word" (00000) were
chosen so that each word began with the same letter, had the same
number of letters and syllables, and occurred with approximately
the same relative frequency based upon Kucera and Frances (1967)
as one of the color names, although not necessarily the same
word for each of the above measures. These precautions were to
ensure approximately the same absolute naming times for words
and color names.
The six colors chosen were: yellow, green, red, orange,
blue, and purple; chosen for their discriminability and contrast
with a light colored background. The corresponding six test
words were: person, output, realm, book, gun, and yankee; chosen
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as indicated above with the additional constraint that no word
should have a color as a strong associate.
A£uaratus. Materials were displayed on a back-projection
screen by two random-access projectors controlled by a PDP 8-1
computer. The words subtended a visual angle of approximately
3.5 degrees. Reaction Times (RTs) were measured by the computer
using a voice-actuated Schmitt trigger as the triggering device.
After each trial, the S was asked to pull a right lever if s/he
responded correctly and a left lever if incorrectly on a response
console in front of the person.
Procedure. Subjects participated in one practice day and
four data days in each of a priming and a facilitation phase of
the experiment. On each day, there were twenty-seven blocks of
sixteen trials each, requiring about one hour of participation.
On each day of the experiment, the S was first shown sample slides
demonstrating each color and its proper name. Sample warning
tones were also demonstrated at this time.
Each trial began with a priming slide printed in white on
black, presented for two seconds. The S named aloud the word
displayed during this period. After a delay of one second, the
test slide occurred with one of the possible words printed in one
of the six colors. 250 msec, previous to the presentation of the
test slide, a 100 msec, tone occurred. The tone was either 200
hertz, indicating that s/he should respond by naming the color
that the word was printed in, or 600 hertz, indicating that the
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proper response was to name the actual word on the screen. After
verbally responding, the S indicated whether the response was
correct or incorrect by pulling a lever on the response ,nsole.
With the completion of this response, the test display disappeared
and the inter-trial interval began.
The inter-trial interval was of two seconds duration. At
the end of sixteen trials the S was told the average reaction
time the number of errors made on that block of trials, and a
number indicating how well s/he was doing relative to a standard
pay-off scheme Ss were instructed to respond as quickly as
possible while making as few errors as possible.
Each trial was either a control trial, in which the priming
word was "00000". a trial in which the priming word and the test
word were the same or a trial in which they were different.
During the facilitation phase of the experiment, 12 1/2% of the
trials were control. 12 1/2% agreed between priming word and test
word, and 7 S% disagreed. During the priming phase, these proba-
bilities were reversed, again with 12 1/2% control, but 7 5%
agreed and 12 1/2% disagreed. (See table 1).
Throughout the experiment, two- thirds of the trials had a
low tone occurring, indicating a color name response was necessary
and one- third had a high tone meaning "respond with the word."
Priming and facilitation phases of the experiment were counter-
balanced between Ss
. Subjects in Group 1 underwent a practice
day and four days of data collection in facilitation trials,
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TABLE 1
Design per Subject
PI
Al A2 A3
Day Tl T2 Tl T2 Tl
1 36 18 216 108 36
2 36 18 216 108 36
3 36 18 216 108 36
4 36 18 216 108 36
G = Counterbalance Group
N = Subjects
P = Predictability
B = Block
A = Agreement
T = Test Mode
P2
Al A2 A3
Day Tl T2 Tl T2 Tl T2
5 216 108 36 18 36 18
6 216 108 36 18 36 18
7 216 108 36 18 36 18
8 216 108 36 18 36 18
Gl = PI then P2, G2 = P2 then PI
Three in each counterbalance group
PI = Facilitation P2 = Priming
Bl = Days 1,2 B2 = Days 3.4
Al = Same prime and test word
A2 = Different A3 = Control
Tl = Say Color T2 = Say Word
Numbers in each cell represent number of observations
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followed by a practice day and four days in priming trials.
Group 2 Ss went through priming trials first, then facilitateon
.
rror
RESULTS
Data were averaged for e*ch condition to produce one mean
reaction time per subject per condition per two-day block. E
trials were eliminated from all analyses. There were no patterns
in the error data to indicate a divergence from the RT data,
other than the difference between different and control for
color naming in the primed condition (nonsignificant, T (10 d.f.)
= 1.M4, p>.10, two-tailed). See figure 1 for error data. Two
five- factor analyses of variance were performed separately on
the color naming and word naming means, using as factors: counter
balancing group; subject within group; predictability -
facilitation or priming; blocks - days one and two or days three
and four; and agreement - same, different, or control. Separate
analysis of variance tests were also performed on the priming
and facilitation phases of the experiment for both word naming
and color naming RTs. In addition, difference scores were com-
puted, showing the effect of the "same" condition relative to
the control and the "different" condition relative to the
control. These difference scores were subjected to the same
analysis of variance tests as the mean RTs. The results of these
analyses are summarized in Appendix 1.
The difference scores present the clearest reading of the
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Error rates range from .5% to 5.6% for each data point
Figure 1. Error Data
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data. Figure two shows, first, that Warren's results (Warren,
19-2) were not replicated There is no difference between the
"same" and "different" points in the facilitation data for word
naming (F (1,4) > 1), but for color naming, "same" difference
RTs are slightly (7 msec.) but significantly (F (1,4) = 7.64,
P<.05) faster than "different" scores. Warren's results predict
that color naming should be slowest in the "same" condition and
fastest in the control, the opposite of the present results.
This interesting contradiction will be addressed in greater
depth later.
The priming data present an altogether different picture.
When the S knows what word to expect and this expectation is
fulfilled, word naming time drops by 50 msec, and color naming
time drops by 28 msec, relative to their respective controls.
If this expectation is not fulfilled, word naming time increases
by approximately 28 msec; color naming, however, is changed
only slightly (+6.6 msec.) by an unfilled expectancy for a
particular word. These maior differences between "same" and
"different" result in a significant Agreement effect for priming
data in both color and word naming (F (1,4) = 40.64, p<.05 and
F (1,4) = 221.38, p<.05, respectively).
Figure three indicates that the data are not quite as neat
as they appear when summarized as difference scores. Looking at
the mean RTs, the group by predictability interaction can be
seen to be significant (F (1,4) = 16.68, p<.05 for color naming
• Facilitation
X X Priming
Color Naming
• --•Word Naming
Figure 2. Difference scores relative to the control
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• • Facilitation
X X Priming
Group 1
— - — Group 2
Figure 3. Mean reaction times showing effect of groups.
Group 1 indicates facilitation first, then priming;
Group 2 indicates priming first, then facilitation.
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and F (1,4) = 26.45, p<.05 for word naming). This is due to
a marginally significant difference between the counterbalance
groups when only the facilitation data is considered. This
pattern is true both for color naming data (F (1,4) = 4.74,
p<.10) and for word naming data (F (1,4) = 4.47, p<.10). In
counterbalance group two, where the priming phase of the exper-
iment preceeded the facilitation phase, overall rt improved
during the facilitation phase by 90 msec, for color naming and
70 msec, for word naming. This brought down all points in the
Group 2 facilitation data equally, not interacting with other
factors.
Table 2 presents the data in a complete breakdown. Two
clearly deviant points are the counterbalance Group 2, Block 1
priming data. Both word and color naming RTs were abnormally
slowed by an unfulfilled expectancy. These are the first and
second days of the experiment for this group of Ss, so a surprise
effect is the most likely cause. Ss developed a very strong
expectation for a particular word which, when contradicted,
surprised them for the first day or two of the experiment.
Notice the interactions of group and predictability with
other factors in the overall analyses (Appendix 1). These appear
to be mainly due to the interactions of group with block and
agreement in the priming phase of the experiment. For instance,
the two deviant points noted above contributed to the group by
agreement and group by block by agreement interactions. In
19
TABLE 2
Mean RTs in msec, for all experimental conditi ons
Color Naming
Facilitation
Priming
Word Naming
Facilitation
Priming
Gl Bl
Gl B2
G2 Bl
G2 B2
Gl Bl
Gl B2
G2 Bl
G2 B2
Gl Bl
Gl B2
G2 Bl
G2 B2
Gl Bl
Gl B2
G2 Bl
G2 B2
Same
594
559
487
486
527
532
554
527
442
418
354
346
365
365
385
339
Different
592
571
495
497
554
569
602
551
450
432
350
338
412
434
488
428
Control
585
576
494
489
556
569
578
547
444
429
347
340
399
425
418
409
Gl indicates facilitation, then priming; G2 is the opposite
Bl indicates days one and two; B2 indicates days three and four
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addition, the mean RT dropped from Block 1 to Block 2 for the
Group 2 subjects (37 msec, in color naming; 38 msec, in word
naming), but increased slightly for the Group 1 subjects (11 msec,
in color naming; 16 msec, in word naming), adding further noise
to the data.
DISCUSSION
The fact that no trace of Warren's effect (1972) can be found in
the data is only mildly disturbing. Recall that Warren found an
increase in color naming time when the test word was pre-cued,
presumeably due to an increased activation level for the word
causing it to reach threshold (Morton, 1969) sooner. Consider
that in the present experiment each S went through a total of
3456 actual test trials, all using a pool of only six possible
words. It seems likely that the full activation level was
reached almost immediately for each word. Since a full day of
practice with the same stimuli preceeded each phase of the
experiment, day by day data analysis will still not reveal at
what point the effect faded, if in fact it was ever present. This
might be one area for further investigation, since a look at how
activation levels reach an asymptote could help to flesh out the
spreading activation (Meyer, Schvaneveldt , and Ruddy, 1972, 19 7 3;
Collins and Quillian, 1970, 1972; Schvaneveldt and Meyer, 1973)
or logogen (Morton, 1969) models. There were also many important
differences between Warren's "xperiment and the present expor-
iment. For instance, Warren used associates to precue the test
word, while the present procedure uses either the test word
itself as the precue or a completely different word.
The major results show that correct priming produces, not
only a drop in word naming times, but also a drop in color
naming RTs
.
This would appear to support a theory such as that
proposed earlier; knowledge of the upcoming word allows the S
to advance processing of that word past a bottleneck near the
start of the limited capacity channel. The effect of a correct
expectancy is to speed the flow of the expected information
through that bottleneck. As mentioned earlier, Dyer obtained
a similar effect (Dyer, 1971) by varying the preexposure of the
word prior to coloration, thereby advancing the processing of
the word and reducing the Stroop interference to color naming.
Also of interest here is the rather negligible effect of an
incorrect expectancy upon color naming. While an incorrect
expectancy slowed word naming by about 28 msec, relative to the
control, it had a very small effect (6.8 msec.) upon color
naming. This small effect is entirely consistent with the pro-
posed theory. Though an incorrect cue word has been primed, the
primed word is now past the point where it will affect the pro-
cessing of the test word and its color. The incorrectly primed
word is already past what bottlenecks might exist to hold up the
color name, so there is no essential difference between the con-
flict of color and test word tollowing an incorrect expectancy
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and that same conflict following no expectancy at all. It
appears, then, that expectation does not act by filtering out or
inhibiting unexpected information
. but solely by passing expected
information more quickly. One possible problem with this inter-
pretation is that error rates rise by 1.2% for incorrectly primed
color naming trials, relative to the control. This may indicate
the presence of a speed-accuracy tradeoff such that the RT for
that point is artificially lowered. However, this rise in error
rate is insignificant by a T test (T = 1.44 on 10 d.f.
, p>.10
two-tailed) and appears to have been caused primarily by only
two subjects.
Since there was no significant effect of incorrect priming
on color naming, why is word naming slowed? The easiest expla-
nation would be than an incorrect expectancy did slow the word's
progress, allowing the color name into the limited capacity
channel first. However, then the color naming time should have
been faster under incorrect priming conditions than under control
conditions, when the word is still competing with the color name.
Another possible explanation is that the word has been loaded
into a response buffer after it exits from the limited capacity
channel. A tone indicating that the correct response was to be
the color name would cause the information to be dropped immed-
iately. A signal to respond with a word name, however, would
only cause the word to be prepared further for output, ie. the
actual information might be readied. When the test word appears f
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different from the expected word, the prepared information must
all be dumped before another word can be readied for output. Of
course, if the expected word appears, a correct response is ready
to be released.
The slight but significant (F (1,4) = 7.64, p<.05) reversal
of Warren's effect for color naming may indicate that, even in
the facilitation phase of the experiment, information is gained
to help predict the test word. While the cue word predicts the
test word on only one-seventh of the facilitation trials (ex-
cluding control trials)
, there seems to be no major drawback to
color naming RT when an incorrect expectancy is produced based
on the small amount of information available. In other words,
evan an incorrect expectation may be better than no expectation
at all. One piece of conflicting evidence is that there is no
change between "same" and "different" difference scores for word
naming data during the facilitation phase; when dealing with the
priming phase, there is a larger effect on word naming data than
on color naming data. It is possible that the difference shown
in the facilitation - color naming conditions is just a chance
occurrence.
If it is not chance, however, then either the strategy of
trying to use the minimal expectancy is employed for only a small
proportion of facilitation trials or there is a continuum of
expectancy effects ranging at least from that found in the facil-
itation phase to that present in the priming phase of the
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experiment. This raises the possibility that there is essentially
no difference in mechanisms between facilitation and priming other
than the magnitude of the effect, ie. the degree of expectancy
involved. However, this explanation is hard to accept in light
of the Warren data. Facilitation in Warren's experiments
(Warren, 1972) caused an increase in color naming time, while
expectancy led to a decrease in color and word naming time in the
present experiment.
So far, only models which propose a separation between
memory areas and limited capacity or conscious processing areas
have been considered. This excludes many other types of models
of processing. I would like to choose just one representative
model which proposes no separable stages and deal with it briefly.
One very simple yet powerful way of looking at processing is
to see how much can be gotten out of a relatively clutterless
model, such as one relying almost exclusively on associations
between the elements in memory and associations of these elements
with temporal cues. In the context of the present experiment,
the possible response colors might form one set of responses
while the possible response word names might form another, where
these two sets are not highly discriminable . When a word is
precued, the representation for that word would be tagged with
a cue indicating that it had just occurred. Looking at word
naming trials, this means that the word with the latest temporal
cue will be most discriminable from the other possible responses.
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On color naming trials, the subject "knows" that he is to respond
with the color name rather than the word name. When a test word
occurs which is the same as a recently tagged word, the discrim-
inability of all word responses from all color name responses is
increased, thereby reducing the reaction time to choose the
proper color name response. In this conceptualization, the major
difference between facilitation and priming trials is that the
priming trials, due to their high predictive ability, increase
the salience of the temporal cue.
The major problem with this model comes again in attempting
to explain the results of the Warren (1970) study. In that
experiment, facilitation of the word name increased the reaction
time to respond with the proper color name. While the precue
provides no additional information, since the subject knows he
is always to respond first with the color name, there appears to
be no simple explanation for an increase in reaction time when
precued with an associate of the test word without resorting to
activation levels in memory once again. A lot of weight in
interpreting the present experiment is being put upon the
accuracy of the Warren results. Before any of these interpre-
tations are accepted, that experiment should be replicated and
expanded upon for further confirmation.
One difficulty with the present study which is extremely
difficult to explain is the apparent counterbalance effect upon
the facilitation data (Figure 2) . This did not interact with the
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Agreement variable, causing only a 90 msec, drop for word naming
and a 70 msec, drop for color naming when the prining phase of
the experiment was first. Since this drop was ec^al for same,
different, and control conditions, it must be attributed to some
general strategy shift which caused a more or less non-specific
decrease in reaction time.
Since it is presumed that the word name is capturing the
limited capacity channel before the color name, and speeding
the flow of the word through priming appears to have resulted in
more rapid color naming, one obvious conclusion is that there
must be an effect of the flow of previous information upon the
time course of subsequent information.
Another, more tentative, conclusion is that the primary
effect of expectation is to pass the expected information more
quickly through the limited capacity channel, with little detri-
mental effect upon unexpected information. This would also seem
to contradict one hypothesis proposed earlier; that the mech-
anism of priming might be in sequencing the operations through
which a stimulus must travel in the limited capacity channel.
If this were the case, some negative effects from improper
expectation would be predicted.
Since the priming in the present experiment was advantageous
to both color and word naming RTs, nothing can be said as to
whether priming could be voluntarily inhibited if it were not
advantageous. In addition, very little can be inferred as to
exactly how priming is effected, other than to eliminate hype
theses which imply an inhibition or filtering of unexpected
information in one way or another. Future research might be
directed at these and related questions.
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APPENDIX
Significant results. All probabilities less than .05
unless indicated (*) , then probability less than .10
Mean Reaction Times
I d.f . M.S. Error
Overall - Color Naming
Agreement 33. 04 2,8 84 .03
Group X Predictability 16. 68 1,4 1443 .06
Predictability X Agreement 11. 99 2,8 61 .43
Group X Predictability X Block 11. 77 1,4 439 .97
Group X Block X Agreement 3. 26 2,8 72 .53
Group X Block X Predict. X Agreement 4. 74 2,8 34 .99
Overall - Word Naming
Agreement 42. 32 2,8 231 .72
Group X Predictability 26. 45 1,4 1739 .53
Predictability X Agreement 76. 37 2,8 113 .42
Group X Block X Predictability 11. 78 1,4 394 .56
Group X Predictability X Agreement 10. 78 2,8 113 .42
Facilitation - Color Naming
*Group 4. 74 1,4 15659 .39
Facilitation - Word Naming
Group 4. 47 1,4 15359 .89
Priming - Color Naming
Agreement 30. 40 2,8 129 .28
*Group X Block 5. 86 1,4 872 .47
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F d.f. M.S. Error
PriminCT — Pol nr» X}am-?»-**-r f #%^~.4- •A 1 iM6 uuj.ut' noinxng ^continued)
GrOUP X Block X AarPPmont 5.51 2,8 41 .64
Priming - Word Naming
Agreement 116.30 2,8 1314 .75
*Group X Block 6.22 1,4 1067 .08
Group X Block X Agreement 8.32 2,8 316 .25
Difference Scores
F d.f. M.S. Error
uvciaii — Loior Warning
39.12 1 1
1
1,4 131 .46
Predictability X Agreement 27.67 1,4 .33
Group 5.45 113
. 33
Group X Predictability X Block 8.32 1 ll1,4 — 1
1
74 . 83
Group X Block X Agreement 16. 04 1 1 24 . 33
Overall - Word Naming
Agreement 55.93 I* 1* ionj^y n 0
. yc
Block 5.25 4 llll ll444
Block X Predictability 4.30 1 ll1,4 419 0 0
Predictability X Agreement 634.69 M 26 .17
Group X Predictability X Agreement 87.23 i,«+ 26 .17
Facilitation - Color Naming
Agreement 7.64 1,4 38,.50
Facilitation - Word Naming
None
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r
r *4 -PG.I. M.S
.
Error
Primincr — Color1 Nta miner
Acreement tin au 1/4
.
^9
*Group Oil!
Group X Block X Agreement 27 ^3 1 U 1 7
Priming - Word Naming
Agreement 221.38 I, 1* 160 .42
Block 10.35 1.4 482 .67
Group X Agreement 13.30 1,4 160 .42

